


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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON**

May 28, 1956



MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Guidance and Actions Taken  
to Exploit the Anti-Stalin Campaign

Transmitted herewith, for the information of the National Security Council, is a report on the subject by a Special Working Group established by the Operations Coordinating Board, on February 29, 1956, to coordinate actions taken to exploit the current Soviet campaign against Stalin.

[Redacted Signature Box]

STAT

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for Disarmament  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
Washington 25, D. C.

May 25, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Report of OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism

Attached is a report by a Special Working Group established by the Operations Coordinating Board on February 29, 1956 to coordinate actions taken to exploit the current Soviet campaign against Stalin.

This paper was discussed at the meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board of May 23, 1956. It was agreed that the contents of the paper were such as to be of possible interest to the members of the National Security Council and that it should be made available for the information of the Council.

/s/

Elmer B. Staats  
Executive Officer

Attachment:

Report of OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism,  
dated May 17, 1956, with Annexes A, B and C.

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ANNEX APERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT  
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE ANTI-STALINISM CAMPAIGN.1. Excerpts from President Eisenhower's speech of April 21:

"It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring relations.

"Despite the changes so far, much of Stalin's foreign policy remains unchanged. The major international issues which have troubled the postwar world are still unsolved. More basic changes in Soviet policy will have to take place before the free nations can afford to relax their vigilance."

"First: We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety.

"We can take some cautious comfort in the signs that the Soviet rulers may have relegated military aggression to the background and adopted less violent methods to promote their aims. Nevertheless, Soviet military power continues to grow. Their forces are being rapidly modernized and equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.

"So long as freedom is threatened and armaments are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a strong military establishment ourselves and strengthen the bonds of collective security."

"Our third guide line is this: We must seek, by every peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to correct existing injustices and genuinely to pursue peaceful purposes in its relations with other nations.

"As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin against other nations still prevail under his successors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin and Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet veto of free all-German elections. The satellite nations of Eastern Europe are still ruled by Soviet puppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided, and stable peace has not yet been achieved."

"The interests and purposes of the United States and of the free world do not conflict with the legitimate interests of the Russian nation or the aspirations of its people. A Soviet government genuinely devoted to these purposes can have friendly relations with the United States and the free world for the asking. We will welcome that day."

2. Excerpts from Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 3:

"The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is highly significant. It is too early to judge its full meaning, but some important conclusions are now possible.

"The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality

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and personal security; for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed.

"Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.

"The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust by blaming them on the past? The down-grading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of one man or several. And the new Five Year Plan shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of the people who are ruled.

"In the field of foreign policy, the Soviet rulers have taken a few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still subjugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the accepted code of international conduct.

"Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberalizing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change. If the free world retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day."

### 3. Excerpts from Secretary Dulles' Address of April 23:

"We are not dedicated to perpetual hatred of Russia. What we hate is the evil that Russia's rulers do. The arbitrary despotism of a police state, governmental intolerance and enforced conformity, the enslavement of people for the magnification of the State, the use of violence and the threat of violence in international relations, the use of fraud and trickery to corrupt and overthrow free governments -- these are all things which we abhor and against which we stand. But United States foreign policy is not merely negative. We seek, above all, to advance the inevitable day when the historic friendship between the Russian and American peoples can again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take deep satisfaction from the fact that we can today see within Russia some signs of light which could mark the dawning of that new day."

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"They mean, I think, that unity and strength of the free nations have shown the Soviet rulers the futility of their policies of violence."

"Stalin has been denoted. But we do not yet see, in the Soviet bloc, the reality of representative government or respect for the basic aspirations of the peoples."

"The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced violence. But they press feverishly to develop their military establishment, particularly nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery."

"The countries of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, are still under the iron heel of Soviet force."

"In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have become merchants of hatred and fomenters of violence."

"In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is still ugly in its aspect."

"In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited with economic lures which may superficially seem attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the bait is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached to a line, the other end of which is purposefully held by Moscow."

"And, if they have admitted some of the lies and false testimony which marked political trials of the Stalin era, they have failed to repudiate two of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by any government, and both perpetrated by Stalin -- the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in the Korean War, and the lie that the United Nations forces in that war used germ warfare against the Chinese Communists."

"Khrushchev said last December, 'We never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the Victory of Communism'. So long as that victory is the Soviet goal; so long as it is backed by a vast military establishment and the underground apparatus of International Communism; so long as these instruments are at the absolute disposal of despots who repudiate moral principles as restraint upon their conduct -- so long as this combination exists, it would be folly for the free nations to consider that they can safely lower their guard and fall apart."

"I have often said in relation to the Soviet Communist problem that the moment of greatest danger would be the moment when we relaxed. Never was that statement more relevant than it is today. If we treat the prospect of success as being itself a complete success, that could turn into an ultimate disaster."

"Soviet rulers and their agents, in their new garb, have somewhat greater acceptability, and therefore more chance for mischief."

"Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to submerge differences as when they faced together a clear and present danger."

"Because Soviet military capabilities remain so vast and because their intentions are subject to rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance and our strength. But also we must increase the unity and dynamism of the free world by greater emphasis on cooperation for something rather than merely against something. Let us exalt freedom by showing better what freedom can do."

#### 4. Excerpts from Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 24:

"Q. - Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in Russia, is there any evidence of any kind that the Russians are modifying their hold on the satellites?"

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"A. - There is no evidence that they are voluntarily modifying their hold. I would say that there is a little evidence that their hold is getting somewhat weaker; not because they want it to be so, but because the changes that have occurred in the Soviet policy have put a certain premium now upon Titoism. And while we think always in terms of the effect of Soviet policy in creating neutralism in the free world camp, the acceptance now of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the Satelllites who think that perhaps Tito is getting the best of both worlds, and that seems to be entirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union; therefore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path? So I do think that, while the Soviets have not indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold, that their hold is becoming looser."

"Q. - Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium on Titoism. Could you specify for us which particular changes you have in mind?

"A. - Of course, the most important characteristic of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that communism can be a national organization; not necessarily an international organization. That was the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin and his associates, who were purged and executed in the Nineteen Thirties because they took the view that you could have communism within a country but did not necessarily have to be a part of what is commonly called 'international communism.'

"The view then held by Stalin was that you could not have communism just within one country, but that you had to have communism as a dynamic movement which was trying to get control of all countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was incompatible with nationalism.

"Indeed, Stalin himself said that Soviet communism is the most international of all organizations because it tries to break down all of the national boundaries. As against this, some people held the view that communism could be a national phenomenon rather than an international phenomenon. That was the view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on that issue, because Moscow did not admit his right to have a national Communistic state which would primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugoslavia.

"If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all right to have communism on a national basis, that offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs and so forth, who would much rather have their own national brand of communism than be run by Moscow."

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Office of Intelligence Research

## Intelligence Brief

No. 1912.2 Date: April 24, 1956

CURRENT STATUS OF THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN  
IN THE SOVIET BLOC<sup>1</sup>

The campaign to downgrade Stalin and to eliminate the shortcomings of one-man rule continues to unfold relatively slowly in the USSR and in most of the satellites. Soviet mention of two figures in the purge trials of the 1930's raises speculation whether these proceedings will be re-examined. In Eastern Europe, Poland (where the campaign is most active) and Czechoslovakia are beginning to replace current officials.

Within the Soviet Union

Exposure of Stalin. Soviet publications have yet to reveal many of the charges against Stalin, in contrast to the satellites, and have failed to give any details concerning the charges already published. The allegations made by Pravda on March 28 and the few added subsequently by other Soviet publications are being repeated without elaboration. Reprints of the Pravda article and the recent Chinese Communist report on Stalin apparently have been published in the regional press.

Oral dissemination of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech and the Central Committee's circular based on it appears to be almost completed, although some local raion Party meetings continue to be reported. Instructions for further dissemination of the line on Stalin were given to meetings of press workers and editors of local newspapers during the past week.

Remedial Actions. Measures to correct some of the results of one-man rule also are being instituted gradually and at a slower rate than in the satellites. During the past week announcement was made of the publication of two volumes of reminiscences about Lenin by "old Bolsheviks" and others and of plans to print previously unpublished writings of Lenin for the period 1917-22. A new edition of Lenin's works is to contain 50 volumes rather than the current 35. These announcements,

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1. For earlier developments, see IB-1902 and IB-1912.

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coupled with appearances of L. A. Fotiyeva at some meetings in Moscow as a speaker and public reference to her as Lenin's secretary, suggest that publication of Lenin's testament (in which Lenin criticized Stalin) may be forthcoming.

The likelihood of further rehabilitations of purge victims was indicated by two events in the past week. Pravda on April 22, in honor of Lenin's birthday, printed a previously unpublished letter of Lenin's addressed, among others, to A. I. Rykov and N. Osinsky. Rykov, who was Lenin's successor as head of the government and a member of the Politburo until 1930, is the highest ranking of prewar purgees to be mentioned so far. Both he and Osinsky were victims of the purges of the 1930's, Rykov being condemned to death in March 1938 at the last of the major trials. Publication of Rykov's name in this manner, without any derogatory reference, resembles the favorable treatment given a number of other purgees during the past weeks and is the first case in which one of the victims of a major trial has been so cited.

At the same time, the legal basis of the purge trials and the chief prosecutor, the late A. Ya. Vyshinsky, have come under attack in the latest issue of the leading Soviet legal journal. This marks the first public criticism since the Party Congress of a Stalin cohort other than Beriya. The article criticized the Soviet investigation system "for recognizing the guilt and responsibility for crimes on the basis of individual confessions of the accused themselves," and Vyshinsky, specifically, for his stand that it was unnecessary to establish "absolute truth" to obtain a conviction.

Articles in the same journal in the past year had emphasized the need to obtain all types of evidence and to strive for absolute truth, but the question of confessions had not been discussed directly. There was no forewarning that Vyshinsky would come under attack in this field since his name was cited as authority on evidence in earlier articles as well as other legal commentary as late as January. The Institute of Law, which is co-publisher of the journal, continues to bear his name.

Reactions. The first provincial echo of Pravda's April 5 attack on "certain rotten elements" for taking advantage of the campaign against the cult of Stalin to question current Party policy was heard in Armenia last week. The local newspaper Kommunist attacked anti-Party statements of certain Party members in Yerevan University and a similar occurrence in a meeting of the Armenian Union of Writers, where "slandorous" statements against Party policy were made. In contrast, a Leningrad official informed a Western correspondent that no such incidents had occurred in his city.

From Tbilisi, Western correspondents, permitted to visit the area for the first time since the demonstrations in early March, succeeded in filing stories through Soviet censorship revealing some details of the

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riots there. The rector of Tbilisi University admitted to interviewers that unorganized demonstrations started on March 5 and continued through March 9, when they were officially authorized. He referred to "dark elements," which he said included former students, relatives of kulaks, and liberated purgees of 1937, as having taken advantage of this situation to the extent that some groups got out of hand, and he admitted that casualties, but no deaths, had occurred. Other sources indicated that from five to 100 persons might have been killed by troops. It was reported that on March 9 a crowd descended upon the main post office in the city and was met there by machine-gun fire. Pockmarks on buildings from gunfire were pointed out to correspondents. Although the reports on the number of fatalities vary considerably, it now is evident that Moscow was compelled to resort to force to put down the demonstrations.

#### Within Other Communist Bloc Countries

The East European satellites are increasingly devoting attention to local manifestations of the cult of the individual. Bulgaria has downgraded its leading Communist official, Vulko Chervenkov, charging that the country's progress would have been considerably greater but for his "vicious methods of work." There are signs that the Czechoslovak Party will not stop at attributing the cult of personality solely to the deceased President and Party Chairman, Klement Gottwald, but is getting ready to take action against the latter's son-in-law, Alexej Cepicka, Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister. In Poland the stress is on the necessity for full public discussion of shortcomings, especially in the matter of "socialist legality." In Albania violations of "socialist legality" have been blamed on Koci Xoxe, removed from his post as Minister of Interior over seven years ago and executed as a Titoist in June 1949. East Germany and Rumania have so far taken no corrective actions, and Hungary has not gone beyond rehabilitating the executed Titoist, Laszlo Rajk, and claiming the release of all imprisoned Social Democrats.

Exposure of Stalin. For the first time Albanian and Bulgarian Party leaders have publicly criticized Stalin, though only in limited and generalized terms. The Bulgarian Central Committee merely noted the importance of decisions reached at the Soviet Party Congress for "merciless struggle against the remnants of the cult of the individual which spread in the last few years during the life and activity of Stalin." The Albanian First Secretary admitted that the cult "brought great misfortune to the Soviet Union," but limited himself to the charge that "Stalin began to put himself above the Party and the people and to detach himself from the masses."

Removal of Symbols. So far, no campaign has been reported to remove public reminders of Stalin--statues and names of streets, squares, and factories. There are unconfirmed reports that in Poland Stalin's works are disappearing from bookstores and that some portraits in public

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places have likewise been removed. The Rumanian bibliographical bulletin has not mentioned any work of Stalin since last December, though previously such works were always mentioned on the first page. Students at a Rumanian university are rumored to have demolished a statue of Stalin in one of the university buildings.

### Corrective Actions

Poland. Poland is still far in the lead within the Soviet bloc, both in repeating detailed charges against Stalin and in encouraging a frank discussion of mistakes committed by the Polish regime. A Trybuna Ludu editorial of April 17, entitled "The Great Renaissance," praised the Soviet Party leadership for its decision to make public the charges against Stalin and to conduct in public the struggle against his errors. The editorial stressed that the Polish Party "has its list of mistakes in the past period" and that an account of these mistakes is being given at hundreds of Party meetings. It called for "public and frank criticism of mistakes made, reaching their deepest sources," for "lively discussions," "clash of views," "exchange of ideas," "bold and determined changes demanded by life." The paper admitted that at these meetings "angry and impassioned words are heard, words of bitterness and hurt, of sharp criticism." Though stress was laid on the sweeping reforms made in the security apparatus, the editorial admitted that "there is perhaps no field of life not in need of a critical scrutiny and changes." Particular attention was given to "improvements in living conditions, which are still so hard for many people in Poland."

The most notable application of this campaign for a "more open public life" has been the extensive reporting of committee sessions of the Sejm (the National Assembly). Deputies are reported to have criticized the workings of several ministries, especially the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Procurator General, for lack of initiative in reviewing trials and sentences in which "inappropriate methods of investigation" were used or "wrong classification of crime" was made. Deputies drew attention to the need to compensate those who had suffered injustices. A Polish radio commentator resumed an attack on the trade-union organization for its failure to enforce laws for the protection of workers' rights.

On April 20 the Justice Committee of the Sejm recommended: (a) that revision of the criminal and civil codes should be speeded up; (b) that the Council of State should extend its control of the Prosecutor General's work; (c) that the terms of reference to the Justice Ministry should be regulated; (d) that judges should be granted independent authority. The Committee also put the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General "under the obligation to submit not later than by September reports on results of action concerning persons who had been unjustly sentenced and who had suffered as a result of the work of court organs. Such persons should receive moral and material compensation."

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Thus the regime has taken action on the "Open Letter to the Minister of Justice," published March 28, which called for a public statement on the legal status of certain released generals. The letter insisted that full satisfaction for injustices committed required public announcement of facts and implied that charges made at trials should be publicly withdrawn.

On April 21 the Party newspaper reported that Stanislaw Radkiewicz, former Minister of Public Security and since February 1955 Minister of State Farms, had been removed from the latter post. Also removed were Central Committee member Stefan Kalinowski, the Prosecutor General, because of "serious neglect in past years of supervision of the security organs," and Brig. Gen. Stanislaw Zarakoski in connection with "abuse in the Military Prosecutor's Office and negligent supervision of the investigative organs of the Polish Army Intelligence Service." It was also announced on April 21 that the Ministers of Justice and Culture had been removed without explanation.

At the same time, an amnesty has been drawn up by the Sejm providing for the first time for the pardoning or mitigation of sentences of persons jailed for political crimes. Five-year sentences are to be quashed, 10-year sentences cut in half, higher sentences reduced by a third, life imprisonment to 12 years, and death sentences to 15 years' imprisonment. Emigres accused of crimes will be pardoned if they return by July 22, 1957. People sentenced for illegally crossing the frontier, for engaging in subversive propaganda, or for not denouncing criminal activities known to them will be pardoned and reference to their punishment expunged from the record.

Czechoslovakia. Alexej Cepicka, son-in-law of the deceased President and Party chief Klement Gottwald, has been singled out in three press articles for specific abuses in connection with the cult of personality. Cepicka, Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister, was criticized by a playwright in the weekly literary newspaper for stopping work on the filming of his play dealing with Army resentment over the Munich decision. Cepicka, who had discussed his criticism of the play with the author, was reported later to have called a meeting of 200 top political officers of the army at which a one-sided condemnation of the play was made. Afterwards, all work on the filming of the play was halted by Cepicka. The paper cited this action as a practical example of the cult of personality.

The second newspaper criticism appeared in Mlada Fronta, journal of the youth league. It stated that the army had taken over for its own use the only cultural and recreational facilities in some towns, thus harming the "unity of the army with the people." It also criticized the army for hanging pictures of Defense Minister Cepicka in military offices. Earlier, it was reported that Cepicka's picture had been removed from the Army Museum and other military offices. Finally, the

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organ of the Ministry of Defense itself, Obrana Lidu, admitted that "the consequences of the cult of personality had reflected themselves unhappily in our People's Army."

Hungary. The Hungarian regime in a Szabad Nep editorial of April 15 admitted widespread dissension within the Party, by implication a resurgence of the right-wing deviationism associated with ex-Prime Minister Nagy's "new course" policies of 1953-54, and criticism of the Party leadership. The editorial criticized by name Communists who made "vile attacks on the Party under the guise of criticism" at Party meetings. At one district Party meeting no one criticized a Communist who "had the nerve to slander the whole socialist system." Certain people are admittedly questioning whether there ever was a rightist deviation in the Party during 1953 and 1954 and whether the policy pursued by Nagy had not been a specific type of application of Marxism-Leninism. Behaviour of this sort was sharply condemned in the editorial: "It is evident that this kind of conduct, demagoguery and anti-Party spirit cannot be tolerated in the Party. These things have nothing in common with the Twentieth Congress." The editorial is clearly intended to put a damper on the wave of criticism and dissatisfaction which has broken out since the rehabilitation of Rajk.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian regime is endeavoring to place the full blame for all harmful effects of the cult of personality on the dismissed Prime Minister, Vulko Chervenkov. The Party newspaper, Otechestven Front, in an editorial on April 18 entitled "The Lesson," charged that much more would have been accomplished in Bulgaria "if the cult built around the person of Vulko Chervenkov and the wrong method of work linked with it had not caused some harm to the state management." It charged that the central administration "was concentrated in the hands of one person, who considered that his word was law. This type of leadership was passed on to the lower offices of the administration. Brutal administration and ordering about was practiced from top to bottom." The editorial insisted that such methods must be eliminated and that at every level from top to bottom "individuals who neglect collaboration with and criticism by the masses should not be tolerated."

Albania. Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha, in an editorial in the Party newspaper on April 14, joined the chorus of satellite leaders decrying the cult of personality and admitting that its manifestations have not yet been entirely eliminated from the Albanian Party. Illegal practices of the state security forces were also admitted by Hoxha, but not blamed on any living member of the regime. Instead, Hoxha claimed that after the First Party Congress in November 1948 the Party reasserted its authority over the security apparatus. The clear implication is that the blame for violations of "socialist legality" is being placed, as in Czechoslovakia, on a long-purged former Party leader. In this case it is Koci Xoxe, Minister of the Interior until his arrest in December 1948. Xoxe, accused of being a Titoist, was executed in June 1949. The Albanian regime has thus shown itself unwilling to appease Tito by rehabilitating Party leaders purged as Titoists, as has now been done both in Hungary and Bulgaria.

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# Intelligence Brief

No. 1912.3

May 5, 1956

Office of Intelligence Research

## CURRENT STATUS OF THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN IN THE SOVIET BLOC<sup>1</sup>

During the past week Soviet media have added new material to the public charges against Stalin, particularly the charge that he was guilty of military negligence on the eve of World War II. The satellites have continued to remain in the lead in taking actions to correct some of the abuses of one-man rule. At the same time, warnings in both the USSR and the satellites to those accused of taking advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to criticize current Party policies leave no doubt that the regimes intend to limit criticism closely.

### Within the Soviet Union

Exposure of Stalin. A Soviet military periodical, Voyennyi Vestnik, for the first time provided details of the charge that Stalin had been guilty of military negligence. The only previous Soviet press reference to this subject was in a Chinese People's Daily article reprinted in Pravda on April 7, which referred merely to his "serious mistakes" in "failing to take necessary precautionary measures on the eve of the anti-Fascist war." The Soviet journal stated that Stalin had not mobilized Soviet industry in time, although new weapons had been designed and the defense industry was capable of meeting military needs. Stalin was said to have attempted to explain away early defeats in the war by characterizing Soviet strategy as "active defense" and alleging that the German attack was unexpected, although he had had ample warning. The journal claimed that Soviet military intelligence revealed in the spring of 1941 the "concentration of a large quantity of German-Fascist forces including large tank units along the western border of the USSR" and that, although the attack was a surprise for Soviet armed forces units, it was no surprise to the top leadership, "at that time concentrated

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1. For earlier developments, see IB's 1902, 1912.1 and 1912.2

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completely in the hands of J.V. Stalin." (No mention was made of similar warnings to Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt.) Because Stalin failed to take adequate precautions, the journal said, the USSR suffered heavy losses of aircraft and operations of Soviet military units were dispersed and unorganized. False conceptions of the retreat to Stalingrad and other losses of territory were propagated to "gloss over tolerated mistakes and defects."

The latest issue of Kommunist provided another addition to the public charges against Stalin. It attacked as mistaken Stalin's thesis that the class struggle would intensify in proportion to Soviet successes in the building of socialism. East German Party chief Ulbricht in March had said that Stalin had used this thesis to justify purges of innocent Communists whose only crime was that they disagreed with him. However, the Soviet press had omitted this claim from its summary of Ulbricht's statement.

It is uncertain to what extent the Soviet people have become acquainted with the details of the anti-Stalin campaign. Only the Pravda items, which have been of a general nature, are likely to have reached the bulk of the population. The military failures noted above, recent signs that certain purge victims have been rehabilitated, and articles on the rewriting of history have appeared for the most part in specialized journals with limited circulation.

Local Party meetings to discuss orally Khrushchev's secret speech are apparently no longer being held, although post-Congress Komsomol and trade union gatherings were still being reported last week. Instructions for further dissemination of the line on Stalin were also given to local meetings of cultural workers and leading personnel of armed forces political organs.

Removal of Symbols and Remedial Actions. Preparations for May Day celebrations in the USSR reflected the anti-Stalin campaign. In contrast to May and November 1955, Stalin's portrait was dropped from the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin quartet, and foreign observers in Moscow found few pictures of Stalin displayed. Some which were seen were later removed.

No further rehabilitations nor revisions of Stalinist history were noted during the week. Kommunist in its latest issue presumably was casting reflections on Stalin's system of rule when it said that Lenin, while merciless in matters of principle, never imposed his views on others and in case of opposition always put his proposals to a vote. The tone of the article left little doubt that this procedure was not followed by Stalin; it is also notable inasmuch as the procedure cited closely resembles that of the Party Presidium as described by Khrushchev

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and Molotov recently at a reception in Moscow. Presumably lower Party organs are to make this one of their principles of decision-making in committee or in bureau sessions.

Reactions. Party determination to limit closely criticism from below was given new emphasis during the past week. The latest issue of Party Life published another attack, similar to Pravda's of April 5, on members who dared to question Party policies. It indicated that some had proposed fundamental revision of these policies and others had "openly ~~chanted~~ allegations made by bourgeois propaganda abroad." Party Life suggested that such conduct would lead to expulsion from the Party. In this connection, Embassy Moscow reported that Party Secretary Shepilov was said to have had a difficult time recently when addressing Moscow University students, some of whom wanted to know what the current leaders were doing "while Stalin was committing the actions now criticized."

#### Within the Satellites

Poland remains in the lead among the satellites both in repeating the detailed charges against Stalin and in launching a broad campaign of criticism against manifold shortcomings in Polish national life. There are signs that a similar, though more cautious, campaign is being prepared in Czechoslovakia.

Removal of Symbols. Bulgaria is the first satellite to rename a place which bore a name in honor of Stalin. A Bulgarian broadcast of April 28 referred to the port city of Varna, previously called Stalin. None of the other satellites are known to have taken similar action.

#### Remedial Actions

Poland. The First Secretary of the Polish Party, Edward Ochab, admitted in an article published in Pravda (Moscow) on April 29 that groups within the Polish Party had shown "political instability" in directly attacking the Party's political line. He accused "petty bourgeois elements" in the Party of influencing some newspapers and magazines to go along with their "anti-Party" attacks and demanded an end to such "opportunism and nationalism." Publication of this article in Pravda lends it greater authority within Poland and was also undoubtedly meant to emphasize to Soviet and other satellite Party organizations that criticism is to be carefully limited.

Perhaps the most publicized follow-up in Poland of the collective-leadership idea currently is the activity in parliament. The Polish Communists so far are alone among the satellites in this action, though

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the Czechs appeared about to follow suit at the end of April. The Polish move, though foreshadowed last year, actually began with a leading Communist editorial in March condemning the "rubber-stamp" character of the Sejm (national assembly), followed by unprecedentedly lively activity of the Sejm commissions during April.

The new line was then formally laid down by Premier Cyrankiewicz, who declared that the Soviet Party Congress in February was the turning-point toward democratization and that one important consequence must be infusion of active legislative content into what he admitted had been the empty form of Communist parliamentarism up to now. He called for genuine parliamentary debate and criticism of the government henceforth, the use of interpellation, more publicity for legislative proposals, supplying of more information to the Sejm by the government as a basis for law-making, less governmental secrecy, and a swing away from governmental decrees to parliamentary bills as the normal way of legislating.

There was every indication that the hand-picked Polish Sejm would from now on go through more of the democratic-type gestures enumerated by the Premier. On April 27, for example, the government publicized the fact that five "Catholic Progressive" deputies (representing a Vatican-anathematized lay group of fellow-traveling churchmen) had voted against the government -- a step previously unheard of -- on a bill to legalize abortions.

Czechoslovakia. That Czechoslovakia might follow Poland's lead in respect to the parliament was signified by the Czech trade-union daily Prace's criticism of the National Assembly and the National Committees for not carrying out the role assigned to them by the Constitution and its call for a "start toward a wide democratization of life in Czechoslovakia."

Czechoslovakia has now followed Bulgaria in taking action against a top official in connection with the campaign against the cult of the individual. The Party Central Committee, meeting on April 19 and 20, expelled Alexej Cepicka from the Politburo and removed him from his posts as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense. Though the public announcement was not made until April 25, Cepicka earlier had been accused in a number of press articles of specific abuses. Cepicka, Defense Minister since April 1950 and son-in-law of the deceased President and Party Chairman Klement Gottwald, has perhaps the most unsavory reputation of any member of the regime, being noted for his arrogance, brutality, and ruthlessness.

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East Germany. The East German Ministry of the Interior announced on April 27 that a number of imprisoned persons who claimed membership in the Social Democratic Party had been granted amnesty by the President. The announcement emphasized that the persons involved had "committed particularly grave crimes" and that their release was intended as a "contribution to a détente." The previous day, President Pieck had announced that 88 persons, including Max Fechner, Minister of Justice purged after the Berlin riots in 1953, had been pardoned and released. Fechner had favored dealing leniently with the strikers and had also upheld publicly the workers' right to strike.

Although the East German regime has thus begun to release prisoners, it is not fully rehabilitating them. A further indication that it does not intend to go very far in confessing past errors was the statement by the Party's propaganda chief that Fechner's successor as Justice Minister, Hilde Benjamin, and Security Chief Ernst Wollweber, would survive recent attacks on "violations of socialist legality." The East German Government is also releasing, according to an announcement of April 26, a total of 698 persons jailed for crimes connected with the Second World War. Only 52 persons are still jailed because of the particular seriousness of their crimes.

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